More Iranian Nuclear Fun

The hits just keep on coming from Iran. Yesterday it was reported on the Islamic Republic News Agency that Iran will officially load fuel into the Bushehr nuclear plant on the 16th of September.

Apparently, this Saturday is simply a delivery of fuel by Russia. IAEA representatives will be on hand to remove the seals from the fuel containers. It will then be stored at Bushehr until injection in September. That's a lot of time for nuclear fuel rods to just be hanging around, wouldn't you agree?

And today Iran announced that it is going to begin building a third uranium enrichment facility in 2011. If things go in Iran like they have in the past the third plant is already being built. Igogettajob has said Iran plans to build ten such facilities.

They ain't makin' Ovaltine folks.

Now, here's a little information posted over at Global Security.org that ought to be keeping everyone up tonight.

According to Paul Leventhal of the Nuclear Control Institute, if Iran were to withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and renounce the agreement with Russia, the Bushehr reactor could produce a quarter ton of plutonium per year, which Leventhal said was enough for at least 30 atomic bombs. Harmon W. Hubbard raised similar concerns in an April 2003 article titled "Plutonium from Light Water Reactors as Nuclear Weapon Material" published by the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center (NPEC). Another report published by the NPEC in 2004 reiterated the concerns about light water reactors and plutonium production.

The report then goes on to say...

Normally for electrical power production the uranium fuel remains in the reactor for three to four years, which produces a plutonium of 60 percent or less Pu-239, 25 percent or more Pu-240, 10 percent or more Pu-241, and a few percent Pu-242. The Pu-240 has a high spontaneous rate of fission, and the amount of Pu-240 in weapons-grade plutonium generally does not exceed 6 percent, with the remaining 93 percent Pu-239. Higher concentrations of Pu-240 can result in pre-detonation of the weapon, significantly reducing yield and reliability. For the production of weapons-grade plutonium with lower Pu-240 concentrations, the fuel rods in a reactor would have to be changed frequently, about every four months or less.

Would Russia supply fuel that frequently? Probably not, especially if Iran pulled out from the NPT. Still wondering why Iran wants to build 10 enrichment plants? Bushehr, with a steady supply of new fuel, could crank out plutonium like there's no tomorrow.

Everyone feel better now?